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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD BRANCH and JEANNE 
BRANCH, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 17178 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I. THE POSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE PLAIN-
TIFFS THAT THE OPERATION OF A FORMATION WATER 
DISPOSAL POND IS AN ULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY 
IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY ON DEFENDANT, IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, 
AND IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF AMERICAN JURIS-
DICTIONS WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE ISSUE. 
The central issue in this case, and the issue upon 
which the questions raised by Defendant concerning negli-
gence, proximate cause and comparative negligence, is 
whether the law governing the use of oilfield formation 
water disposal pits is strict liability based on ultra-
hazardous activity or traditional negligence law. The 
decision on that point resolves most of the remaining points 
on the appeal. 
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Despite the fact that both parties requested instruc-
tions to the jury on negligence and proximate cause, (R. 
67,77,79,94 and 97), the trial court decided that the law 
of strict liability applied. In discussing the law to be 
applied in the case with counsel during the trial, the 
following dialogue occurred when Defendant's counsel in-
sisted that a finding of negligence by the jury was neces-
sary and proper: 
Mr. McKeachnie: Your Honor, this fact situation 
comes up every day in Rural Utah in irrigation 
water, where my water escapes from my property and 
goes into my neighbor's basement, or onto my 
neighbor's fields; and the test there is the test 
of negligence. 
The Court: Well, now wait just a minute. 
Mr. Mangan: You've got a different situation 
here. 
The Court: I think that a test of negligence 
is --
Mr. McKeachnie: The test there is: Did I act as 
a reasonably prudent irrigator to control my 
water. 
The Court: Well, the point is that if you did 
everything that a reasonable prudent person could 
to control the water, then it's not your fault 
that it goes onto somebody else's ground. That's 
what you are talking about, is it's somebody 
else's fault that it goes there. It isn't an act 
of God --well, it could be an act of God, but it's 
somebody else's fault, either an act of God, or 
somebody else's fault that the water gets on 
there. 
Mr. McKeachnie: But I was intentionally applying 
the water to my property. 
The Court: All right. But if you are intention-
ally irrigating your ground and -- well, let's put 
it this way: That's a different story. 
-2-
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Mr. Mangan: Unlawful act. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Why is it different? 
The Court: No. Where you know or have reason to 
believe, and the jury's got to decide that case 
that's a different color of a horse than putting 
something in a pit that seeps down into the other 
guy's property. You've got a right to have him 
quit doing that. 
Mr. McKeachnie: The test is still negligence. 
The Court: No. The test is not negligence at 
all, where it's a willful act such as that. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Well, what's the "willful"? 
The Court: Doing it. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Intentionally deposit the water? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. McKeachnie: All right. But aren't you inten-
tionally putting the water on your property? 
The Court: No. What you want to say is, and what 
I want to say is, that there's a difference in 
intentionally putting the water on your crop and 
intentionally putting the water on somebody else's 
land. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Okay. And you say we are inten-
tionally doing that? 
The Court: 
tion. If it 
other guy's 
putting the 
Well, yes. 
seeps down 
land, then 
stuff into 
Well, it's a jury ques-
through and goes onto the 
you are intentionally 
his well. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Just by virtue of the fact that 
it goes there? 
The Court: Sure, if that's what happened. 
Mr. McKeachnie: How is that different than irri-
gating on a hill where it comes out down below? 
That happens every day. 
-3-
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The Court: If you are irrigating on a hill and 
the water gets away from you, I think it's the 
same kind of thing; because the originally rea-
sonable and prudent person would know that to put 
x-second-feet of water on a hillside is to get 
away and go on to somebody else's ground. 
Mr. McKeachnie: If the ordinary prudent man 
passes the test, we'll live with that. 
The Court: No, that isn't the test there. The 
test is, there's no negligence question in this 
case, in my judgment, and that's the way that it's 
going to be. 
Mr. Mangan: I agree with that. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Suppose that unbeknownst to 
Western Petroleum --
The Court: And if that's error, I give you a real 
clear shot at it, because I can't equivocate in 
that regard. I've already stated that negligence 
is not involved in this case. 
Mr. McKeachnie: If that's the case, then what you 
are doing is saying that anybody that's in the 
water hauling business that uses a pit has strict 
liability. 
The Court: Anybody that pollutes somebody else's 
well has strict liability. There isn't any doubt 
about it in my mind. 
Mr. McKeachnie: We are making a strange mixture 
of comparative negligence. 
The Court: No. No. No. No. No. There's no 
comparative negligence at all. 
Mr. McKeachnie: I'm lost. I don't understand it. 
The Court: Negligence hasn't anything to do with 
it. 
Mr. McKeachnie: But that's the only contention in 
which percentages come up. 
-4-
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The Court: No, it isn't, because if the well is 
being contaminated by two sources, I want to know 
how much is being contaminated by one source and 
how much by the other. 
Mr. Mangan: See, and that's not negligence, that 
could both of them be strict liability. 
The Court: And I'm sorry that you don't agree 
with me, particularly you, that negligence is not 
involved in this case. 
Mr. Allred: I'm sorry, Judge, but I've read three 
A.L.R. 's and everyone of them says that's the 
theory to use. 
Mr. McKeachnie: What we are talking about in the 
general concept of tort law then is you are de-
fining this activity as an ultra-hazardous activity. 
The Court: As a matter of fact, that's about what 
I'm saying. 
Mr. McKeachnie: So that whatever happens, it's 
such a risky activity that whatever happens that 
goes wrong, you pay? 
The Court: Right, under the facts of this case. 
He may be right as far as the general questions of 
negligence is concerned. But under the facts of 
this case, what they are doing there is so risky 
and so ultra-hazardous as far as pollution is 
concerned that there's just liability if --
Mr. McKeachnie: What they are doing, everybody 
else is doing. 
The Court: Yes. And that's, as far as I'm con-
cerned, that, as the law, would be applicable to 
them, too. I just don't think you can pollute 
somebody's well and escape liability for it be-
cause you were doing what a reasonable and prudent 
person would do under the same or similar circum-
stances. 
Mr. McKeachnie: What factors --
-5-
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The Court: Because it may get blown up. If you 
are engaged in, as we had a case, in making ex-
plosives and one thing and another and the ex-
plosives get away and cause damage to somebody, I 
think you are liable. 
Mr. McKeachnie: Well, that's standard law. But 
the law hasn't classified this activity. (T. 385-
410) 
The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to sustain the 
trial court and hold that, "Defendant was strictly liable 
for the results of its act of intentionally conducting an 
ultra-hazardous activity .... " To adopt this position would 
be to adopt the antiquated and repudiated doctrine of 
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. The authorities the 
Plaintiffs rely on for their position, Edwards v. Talent 
Irrigation District, 280 Or. 307 (1977); 570 P.2d 1169, 
Drake v. Smith, 337 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1959); 142 A.L.R. 1322; 
and, 28 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1087 (1953), do not support their 
position and did not consider the issue. See, the discussion 
of those cases at Point II. The jurisdictions which have 
considered the same facts and issues that are before this 
Court have uniformly held that the plaintiff's recovery must 
be based upon a theory of either negligence or nuisance. 
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyer, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ken. 1953); 
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936); 
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1961). 
The court in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co. , supra, illustrate 
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ed 
the strong policy supporting the rejection of the contention 
that the operation of evaporation ponds constituted an 
ultra-hazardous activity which should give rise to strict 
liability when that court stated that: 
The primary question for determination here is 
whether or not the defendants in error, without 
negligence on their part, may be held liable in 
damages _for the destruction or injury .to property 
occasioned by the escape of salt water from ponds 
constructed and used by them in the operation of 
their oil wells. 
[T]he innnediate question presented is whether or 
not defendants in error are to be held liable as 
insurers, or whether the cause of action against 
them must be predicated upon negligence. We 
believe the question is one of first impression in 
this court, and so we shall endeavor to discuss it 
in a manner in keeping with its importance. 
upon both reason and authority we believe that the 
conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals that 
negligence is a prerequisite to recovery in a case 
of this character is a correct one. Id, at 221-
222. ~ 
In holding that Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 
was not good precedent for that type of case, the Texas 
court stated: 
While the rule has been followed to some extent in 
this country, in general the American courts base 
liability, where dams have broken, on negligence, 
either in the original construction of the reser-
voir or in failing properly to provide against all 
such contingent damages as might reasonably be 
anticipated. 
-7-
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Accordingly it [the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher) 
has not met with general acceptance in this country· 
most of the authorities holding that liability for ' 
such injuries must be based upon negligence or 
other culpability on the part of the person sought 
to be responsible. The authorities are so numerous 
as to make a review, or even the citation of them 
all, impracticable. 
There is nothing unlawful in collecting water for 
such purposes; and hence, in case it escapes and 
does mischief, the person so collecting it can 
only be held liable on the ground of something 
unlawful in the manner in which he has built or 
maintained his structure,-that is, on the princi-
ple of negligence. Id, at 222-224. 
The Texas court, after an in-depth analysis of Rylands 
v. Fletcher, rejected that doctrine finding that (a) the 
doctrine was generally repudiated in the United States, (b) 
that the case and the conditions were factually different 
than the conditions which gave rise to the case in England, 
and (c) that liability based upon negligence rather than 
absolute liability was the rule adopted by the majority of 
jurisdictions in America. Id 226. 
The record in this case is completely barren of any 
evidence even remotely indicating that the placing of forma-
tion water in evaporation pits is an ultra-hazardous activity 
which cannot be adequately regulated by the traditional 
concepts of fault. To the contrary, all evidence before the 
Court indicated that what Defendant was doing was a usual 
and customary activity in oilfield operations and that there 
are no inherent dangers involved and that it may be safely 
conducted if done in a reasonable and prudent manner. 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Adoption of the Respondents' position that the De-
fendant is strictly liable would be to adopt a rule long 
since repudiated, would be contrary to the evidence and 
would reject the position taken by courts which have con-
sidered the issue before this Court. 
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POINT II. THE AUTHORITIES AND FACTS THE PLAINTIFFS 
CITE TO SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENT THAT DE-
FENDANT VIOLATED STATE LAW, THAT THE DE-
FENDANT'S ACTIVITIES WERE WILLFUL AND 
WANTON AND THAT THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT 
LIABILITY SHOULD APPLY DO NOT SUPPORT 
THE PLAINTIFFS' POSITION, AND ARE TAKEN OUT 
OF CONTEXT AND WERE REJECTED BY THE COURT. 
Plaintiffs' continuous assertions that Defendant's 
operation of its formation water evaporation pit violated 
State statute, e.g. Plaintiffs' brief, pages 13-14, are not 
supported by any finding of the jury and, in fact, were 
specifically rejected by the Court when it refused to 
instruct the jury that such a violation had occurred, con-
eluding that the part relating to permits did not apply to 
this particular fact situation. (T. 397 lines 15,16,17) 
Plaintiffs made numerous attempts over a period of years to 
enlist the aid of the State of Utah in their dispute with 
Defendant. Despite such efforts, the record clearly in-
dicates that the State took no action to prosecute Defendant 
for violating State law or regulations or to require a 
cessation of Defendant's business. To the contrary, the 
record shows that Defendant met with State officials and had 
discussions regarding the pit, participated with the State 
in a dye test to see if formation water from the pond was 
entering into Plaintiffs' well, and otherwise acted in a 
reasonable manner whenever the State officials corranunicated 
with it. (T. 112,153; Exhibits 12, 24) Plaintiffs failed 
to prove their claims of unlawfulness at trial and their 
-10-
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reassertion of those claims here do not fairly reflect the 
outcome of the case in the Court below. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' version of the facts, as argued 
in their brief, constantly charging willful and wanton 
conduct on the part of Defendant, deviates substantially 
from the facts disclosed by the record. Even Plaintiffs' 
counsel, in his final argument to the jury, realized that 
willful and malicious conduct had not been proven when he 
said: 
Now that 'willful and malicious' is a hard thing 
to prove and talk about. And I don't think that 
Mr. Kay would go up there and say, I'm going to go 
pollute Branches' well. That sounds like willful 
and malicious. But a reckless indifference and a 
disregard, that I think has been proven. (T. 
503) 
Plaintiffs rely on Exhibit 38 in claiming that Defen-
dant was violating an order of the State. That letter was 
not an order and was not sent by either the State Water 
Pollution Board or the Oil, Gas & Mining Division which 
regulates oil and gas activities. The Defendant's agents 
never received the letter. (T. 152,193) The writing on 
Exhibit 38 states, "I am not sure this letter was sent." 
The party who allegedly sent the letter visited the pit 
several times after the letter was sent and took no further 
action and the agencies which have authority over these 
types of activities made no effort over a period of years 
following the claimed order to halt the Defendant's activi-
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ties but instead, indicated the pit was satisfactory or 
worked with the Defendant to determine if the formation 
water was percolating into the underground water system. 
(T. 81,152,193) 
The Court also hesitated in allowing the punitive 
damages found by the jury when, after trial, it reduced the 
jury finding of punitive damage of $13,000.00 to $5,000.00. 
(R. 258) The Court later changed its mind and deleted the 
$10,000.00 award for discomfort and annoyance and let the 
punitive damage award stand. (R. 259) The Court should not 
be misled by Plaintiffs' assertions of fact which are not 
supported by the record. 
On a similar point, the authorities used to support 
Plaintiffs' position in their brief often lack any relevance 
to the proposition for which they are cited. For example, 
on page 12 of Plaintiffs' Brief, in support of the proposi-
tion that the law of negligence does not apply, the Plaintiffs 
rely on Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, 280 Or. 307 
(1977); 570 P.2d 1169; Drake v. Smith, 337 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 
1959); 142 A.L.R. 1322; and, 28 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1087 (1953). 
Even a cursory reading of those authorities reveals that 
they do not stand for the proposition asserted. In Edwards 
v. Talent Irrigation District, supra, the defendant's re-
covery was premised on a finding that the plaintiff was 
negligent which is the majority rule and the position of the 
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Defendant. Drake v. Smith, supra, was based on the theory 
of nuisance and the issue before that court involved the 
question of permanent depreciation. 142 A.L.R. 1322 is a 
compilation of cases considering whether damages for dis-
comfort, annoyance, etc., can be awarded in nuisance cases. 
28 A.L.R.2d 1075 considered cases discussing damage awards 
for shock due to witnessing property damage. 
The authorities and facts cited by the Plaintiffs are 
often taken out of context and do not support the proposi-
tion advanced by the Plaintiffs. Defendant would request 
the Court to carefully consider the facts of the case and 
the authorities cited. 
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POINT III. DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED A HEARING 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE JURY SELECTION WAS 
PROPER AND, IF NOT, WHETHER THE DEFENDANT 
WAS PREJUDICED. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant must show that it has 
sustained "actual and substantial injustice and prejudice" 
before it would be entitled to a new trial on the grounds of 
improper jury selection. Defendant's point on appeal is 
that it has been denied the opportunity to make that show-
ing. Defendant should be granted a hearing to allow it to 
make the necessary showing as provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-46-16(2). 
-14-
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POINT IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPORTION THE DAMAGES 
ACCORDING TO THE PERCENTAGE OF POLLUTION 
ATTRIBUTED BY THE JURY TO THE DEFENDANT 
AND TO OTHER THIRD PARTIES AND CONDITIONS 
IF THE DEFENDANT IS STRICTLY LIABLE. 
The damages, if any, awarded to the Plaintiffs should 
be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to 
Plaintiffs and other parties pursuant to this State's com-
parative negligence statute. If the Court were to pronounce 
the law of strict liability as governing this case, a 
proposition which Defendant strongly resists, then the 
damages should be apportioned based on the percentage of 
pollution caused by each party. It would be wrong to hold 
the Defendant liable for the entire damages when the jury 
has determined that the Defendant was responsible for only 
part of the pollution. Monroe Corp. Pond Co. v. River 
Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325 (1927); R. 
Clark Water and Water Rights §219.3(B); and, Restatement of 
Torts Second §433A (1965). 
The Plaintiffs' argument that if the total dissolved 
solids in Plaintiffs' well water is multiplied by the 
percentage pollution attributed to Defendant, then De-
fendant is responsible for all dissolved solids above 
health standards is not logically or scientifically sound 
and it is not supported by the evidence nor the jury 
instructions. The major fallacy in Plaintiffs' ar-
gument is that pollution and total dissolved solids are 
-15-
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not synonymous. (T. 128-129) Plaintiffs called Mr. 
Richards, a chemist, who stated that water could have a high 
level of certain substances such as sugar which would not be 
harmful, while a very low level of mercury or other toxic 
substances could be deadly and still be below any health 
standard for dissolved solids. (T. 128-129) The Court 
recognizing the difference between pollution and total 
dissolved solids instructed the jury that the term "pol-
lution" referred to man-made alterations of the quality of 
water that appreciably impaired its usefulness for a parti-
cular purpose. (R. 119) If it were otherwise, both milk 
and orange juice would be unhealthful because of too high a 
level of dissolved solids. Therefore, any percentage of 
pollution would cause damage to the Plaintiffs. The jury, 
following the instruction of the Court, determined the 
percentage of pollution attributable to Defendant and to 
other parties and conditions. The jury did not determine 
the percentage of total dissolved solids attributable to the 
parties or even any particular sample. 
The jury found that the Defendant was not responsible 
for all the damage caused to Plaintiffs' well. If the Court 
determines that the strict liability rule applies, the 
damages should be apportioned and justice requires that 
Defendant only be held responsible for the percentage of 
pollution attributed to the Defendant by the jury. 
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POINT V. THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM FOR 
DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, DISCOMFORT 
AND ANNOYANCE. FURTHERMORE, THE RESPONDENTS 
FAILED TO REQUEST THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURORS ON THE ISSUE, AND, THEREFORE, THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER IN DELETING THOSE 
DAMAGES FROM THE VERDICT DUE TO THEIR SPECU-
LATIVE NATURE. 
The Court correctly ruled at the end of Plaintiffs' 
case that the Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to 
support their claim for damages for emotional distress, 
discomfort and annoyance. The Defendant, at the close of 
the Plaintiffs' case, moved to dismiss that claim. The 
Plaintiffs' counsel pointed out to the Court that its 
clients had testified that they had been emotionally dis-
tressed and that Mrs. Branch had left her husband and re-
turned to Colorado at one point. The Court held that since 
there had been no specific showing by the Plaintiffs of the 
extent of the damages, that to allow the jury to return a 
verdict on that evidence would be to allow the jury to 
speculate. (T. 238-241) The Court, however, did allow the 
Plaintiffs to reopen their case with the opportunity to 
produce evidence to support their claim. The evidence which 
was produced by the Plaintiffs on rebuttal merely repeated 
the evidence that the Plaintiffs had produced the first 
time. At no time did the Plaintiffs produce any evidence as 
to the extent of the damages they suffered as a result of 
emotional distress, discomfort and annoyance. The Court 
did, however, at the insistence of the Plaintiffs, ask the 
jury: 
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What separate damages, if any, did Plaintiffs 
suffer by reason of mental suffering, discomfort 
or annoyance resulting in the pollution of Plain-
tiffs' wells, if any. (J. Question No. 18, R. 
139) 
The jury answered $10,000.00. After considering the jury 
verdict, the Court again dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for 
damages due to mental suffering, discomfort or annoyance on 
the basis that the jury was not instructed as to the re-
quirements and limits for such an award, and further that 
such damages had not been proven and were, therefore, 
speculative. 
The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their 
position require special circumstances such as malice and 
fraud, before an award can be made for mental anguish, 
discomfort and annoyance. Valley Development v. Weeks, 364 
P.2d 730 (Colo. 1961); and, Murphy v. City of Tacoma, 374 
P.2d 976 (Wash. 1962). Legal limitations must be applied to 
the award of such damages as pointed out by the comment (j) 
to §46 of the Restatement of Torts Second: 
Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attain-
able in this world, and some degree of transient 
and trivial emotional distress is part of the 
price of living among people. The law intervenes 
only where the distress inflicted is so severe 
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure 
it. 
This State has been reluctant to award damages for 
emotional distess. See, Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 341 (1961) 
Therefore, before such an award can be made, the jury must 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be adequately instructed so that it can make the appropriate 
findings which are necessary before such an award may be 
properly allowed. In the present case, no instruction was 
given to the jury defining or explaining what must be shown 
in order to allow damages for discomfort and annoyance. The 
jury was merely asked "what separate damages if any, did 
Plaintiffs suffer by reason of mental suffering, discomfort 
or annoyance resulting in the pollution of Plaintiffs' 
wells, if any." (Question No. 18, R. 139). To ask such a 
question without any instruction as to what is legally 
recognized as mental suffering, discomfort or annoyance was 
error. In assessing damages for mental suffering, dis-
comfort and annoyance, the jury was required to speculate, 
since the Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence on that 
issue. The trial court's exercise of its discretion in 
deleting that claim from the judgment was proper and should 
be sustained. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's adoption of the strict liability doc-
trine of Rylands v. Fletcher was not supported by the evi-
dence and was contrary to the law of other jurisdictions 
which have considered this issue. The case should be re-
mantled to the trial court with instructions that the case be 
handled as a negligence case with instructions on proximate 
cause and comparative negligence. In the event this Court 
does decide that strict liability does apply, then the 
Court, in fairness, should apportion the damages according 
to the jury's finding. 
The Plaintiffs failed to produce any competent evidence 
as to the amount of damages they sustained due to emotional 
distress, annoyance and discomfort. The jury was not in-
structed on that issue and the trial court was proper when 
it deleted those damages due to their speculative nature. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that the jury verdict 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of December, 1980. 
MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C. 
53 South 200 East 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
789-4908 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
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